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INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE1
Stephen E. Sachs is an assistant professor at
Duke University School of Law. He teaches and
writes about civil procedure and conflict of laws, and
he has an interest in the sound development of these
fields.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The parties in this case defend two sides of a
many-sided circuit split. This brief argues that a
third view is correct.
If a contract requires suit in a particular forum,
and the plaintiff sues somewhere else, how may the
defendant raise the issue? Petitioner Atlantic Marine
Construction Company suggests a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) or 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406,2 on the theory that the contract renders venue improper. Pet. Br. 3. Respondent J-Crew ManAll parties have consented in writing to the filing of this brief.
No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,
and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended
to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. Duke University School of Law provides financial support for activities
related to faculty members’ research and scholarship, which
helped defray the costs of preparing this brief. (The School is
not a signatory to the brief, and the views expressed here are
those of the amicus curiae.) Otherwise, no person or entity other
than the amicus curiae or his counsel has made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this
brief.
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Unless otherwise indicated, all “Rule” references are to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and all statutory references
are to Title 28, U.S. Code.
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agement, Inc. contends that venue remains proper,
and that the defendant’s only remedy is a transfer
motion under § 1404. Br. in Opp. (BIO) 11.
Both sides are wrong. Forum-selection clauses
have no effect on venue, which is defined by statute.
While parties can waive their venue objections in advance, they cannot destroy proper venue by private
agreement.
At the same time, an exclusive forum-selection
clause does more than just inform a court’s discretion
under § 1404. If the clause is valid and enforceable, it
waives the plaintiff’s right to sue in an excluded forum, offering the defendant an affirmative defense to
liability in that forum and the right to have the suit
dismissed.
The Federal Rules already specify the correct
method of raising this defense: it must be affirmatively stated in the answer, which the defendant may
accompany with an immediate summary judgment
motion. See Rules 8(c)(1), 12(b), (a)–(b). Often, as
here, the parties’ agreement will be incorporated in
the complaint. In that case, the defendant may alternatively raise the defense in a pre-answer Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, or a post-answer Rule
12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The Rules’ default procedures are practical as
well as correct. They enable defendants to obtain
quick and decisive enforcement of their forumselection clauses, through the same procedures used
to enforce binding prior judgments, settlements, or
arbitral awards. And while there may be some practical advantages to treating forum-selection clauses
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as if they affected venue, these advantages have been
greatly exaggerated—and, in any case, provide no
reason to misapply the Federal Rules.
Here, the parties agreed that their disputes
“shall be litigated” in state or federal court in
Norfolk, Va. J.A. 28. J-Crew violated that agreement
by suing in the Western District of Texas. Assuming,
as the Court should, that the clause at issue is valid
and enforceable, the complaint could have been dismissed by motion under Rule 12(b)(6). Instead, Atlantic Marine made this forum-selection defense under the label of Rule 12(b)(3). That may have been
good enough to raise the issue, but the Court should
leave such preservation questions to the court of appeals in the first instance. Because that court (and
the district court) proceeded on the erroneous assumption that § 1404 was the only available remedy,
this Court should identify the correct procedure, vacate the judgment, and remand the case for further
proceedings.
ARGUMENT
I.

Forum-Selection Clauses Cannot Render
Improper a Statutorily Proper Venue.
A.

Proper venue is defined by statute.

In ordinary speech, “venue” often serves as a
general term for “place” (as in a “wedding venue”). As
forum-selection clauses concern the proper place of
litigation, it may be natural to think—as Atlantic
Marine argues, and as a number of the courts of
appeals have ruled—that such clauses also determine
the proper venue.

4
But that is a mistake. The term “venue,” as it
appears in the Federal Rules and in Title 28, is a
term of art, defined to “refer[] to the geographic specification” by Congress of particular courts “for the
litigation of a civil action.” § 1390(a). In each case,
venue is “statutorily specified,” Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 183 (1979), as proper or
improper in a given judicial district regardless of
what the parties have agreed.
That conclusion flows directly from the statutory
text. Section 1391, the general venue statute,
provides that “[a] civil action may be brought in” various judicial districts. § 1391(b) (emphasis added).
Just as the Federal Rules “regularly use ‘may’ to
confer categorical permission,” so do various “federal
statutes that establish procedural entitlements” for
one party or another. Shady Grove Orthopedic
Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437
(2010). Section 1391’s use of “may” falls in the same
category. Like other Rules and statutes, it “creates a
categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets
the specified criteria to pursue his claim,” ibid.—at
least insofar as venue is concerned.
A judicial district that Congress has identified as
a “proper venue for a civil action,” § 1391(a)(2), therefore does not become an “improper venue,” Rule
12(b)(3), or a “wrong” venue, § 1406(a), simply
because the parties privately agreed to sue
somewhere else. Rather, the procedural entitlements
conferred by the general venue statute “govern the
venue of all civil actions brought in district courts of
the United States,” “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by
law.” § 1391(a)(1) (emphasis added).

5
Rejecting this reasoning, Atlantic Marine treats
any suit filed in the incorrect place as having wrong
or improper venue—emphasizing the plain meanings
of “wrong” and “improper.” Pet. Br. 15 & n.5. The
plain meanings of those adjectives are beside the
point, because what matters is the technical meaning
of “venue.” Indeed, reading forum-selection clauses to
destroy statutory venue would make a hash of a
detailed legislative scheme. For example:
•

Forum-selection clauses are particularly helpful
in international agreements, when at least one of
the parties resides abroad. Cf. The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972)
(describing forum selection as “an indispensable
element in international trade, commerce, and
contracting”). But Congress has specified that,
“for all venue purposes,” § 1391(c), a defendant
residing outside the United States “may be sued
in any judicial district” and should be “disregarded in determining where the action may be
brought with respect to other defendants,”
§ 1391(c)(3). If forum-selection clauses change
where venue lies, then either § 1391(c) does not
really control “for all venue purposes” like it
says, or else such clauses are inoperative just
when they might be most needed.

•

The agreement here permits a federal forum, see
J.A. 28, but the parties could just as easily have
specified a state or foreign court instead. In that
case, under Atlantic Marine’s view, venue would
be improper in every federal judicial district. Pet.
Br. 18–19. But Congress enacted a fallback venue statute to guarantee that, “[e]xcept as other-

6
wise provided by law,” § 1391(a), and in any case
within the federal courts’ personal jurisdiction,
venue will always lie in some judicial district
should there be “no district in which an action
may otherwise be brought as provided in this
section.” § 1391(b)(3); cf. Brunette Machine
Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, 710
n.8 (1972) (“Congress does not in general intend
to create venue gaps, which take away with one
hand what Congress has given by way of jurisdictional grant with the other.”).
•

When a case is removed from state to federal
court, the general venue statute does not apply.
See § 1390(c). Instead, the case can typically be
removed only to a particular court, “the district
court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending.” § 1441(a). Suppose, for example, that
J-Crew had sued in state court in Bell County,
Texas, and that Atlantic Marine had removed to
the Western District to enforce its forumselection agreement there. Because the clause selects a different district, venue would allegedly
be improper in the removal court—even though
§ 1441(a) renders venue automatically proper in
the forum designated by statute. Polizzi v.
Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663, 665–66
(1953); see also 17 Moore’s Federal Practice
§ 111.36[5][a], at 179 (3d ed. 2013) (Moore).

These results are difficult to square with the
framework created by Congress.
By contrast, applying that framework straightforwardly makes the venue analysis here easy. The

7
parties’ contract called for a construction project in
the Western District of Texas. See Pet. App. 4a n.10.
That project was a “substantial part of the events
* * * giving rise to the claim,” § 1391(b)(2), so the
case “may be brought” in the Western District,
§ 1391(b), at least as far as venue is concerned. See
Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co.,
529 U.S. 193, 198 (2000) (noting, in a suit alleging
breach of contract, that venue under the substantialpart standard is “clearly proper” in a district “within
which the contract was performed”).
B. A venue that is proper under § 1391 is
not “wrong” under § 1406.
Atlantic Marine does not claim that the venue
statutes actually contain some invisible-ink exception
for forum-selection clauses. Instead, it tries to shoehorn forum selection into § 1406, which permits dismissal or transfer by a district court “in which is filed
a case laying venue in the wrong division or district.”
§ 1406(a). Atlantic Marine contends that “wrong” refers to any defect in the forum (e.g., lack of personal
jurisdiction), not just whether the suit was filed “contrary to the venue statutes.” Pet. Br. 9, 15.
This claim implicates a wholly different circuit
split,3 and in any case it is incorrect. Applying § 1406
Compare, e.g., In re Carefirst of Md., Inc., 305 F.3d 253, 255–
56 (CA4 2002) (accepting this “broad construction” of § 1406(a),
though the statute’s “language suggests otherwise”), with Viernow v. Euripides Dev. Corp., 157 F.3d 785, 793 (CA10 1998) (rejecting this reading as “strained”); see also 17 Moore
§ 111.02[1][b][ii][B], at 23. Note that none of the cases cited at
Pet. Br. 15–16 discuss § 1406 in this context.
3

8
to every defect in the forum would read “laying venue” out of the statute—as if the text simply referred
to any case “filed * * * in the wrong division or district.”4 Instead, this Court has always described
§ 1406 as specifically addressing venue. The section
“authorize[s] the transfer of cases, however wrong
the plaintiff may have been in filing his case as to
venue, whether the court in which it was filed had
personal jurisdiction over the defendants or not.”
Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962)
(emphasis added); see also ibid. (§ 1406 designed to
prevent injustice resulting from an “erroneous guess”
as to facts “upon which venue provisions often turn”
(emphasis added)); accord Henderson v. United
States, 517 U.S. 654, 667 (1996); Johnson v. Ry. Exp.
Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 466 n.12 (1975); Reviser’s
Note to § 1406, 28 U.S.C. at 803 (Supp. 2. 1949)
(§ 1406(a) permits transfer “where venue is improperly laid”).
Atlantic Marine’s attempt to “blur” venue with
other concepts under § 1406 is not just “unfortunate,”
14D C. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure:
Jurisdiction § 3827, at 579–80 (3d ed. 2007) (Wright);
it would also render other statutes mere surplusage.
If a case “lay[s] venue in the wrong * * * district”
whenever jurisdiction is absent, then Congress would
not have needed a separate statute to permit transfers for “want of jurisdiction,” see § 1631, or to avoid
“‘jurisdictional’ dismissals” under the Suits in AdmiVenue was restricted by division, as well as by district, when
Congress enacted § 1406. See § 1393 (Supp. 2 1949) (repealed
1988).
4

9
ralty Act, see Henderson, 517 U.S. at 667 (citing 46
U.S.C. App. § 742 (1994), codified as amended at 46
U.S.C. § 30906(b)). Likewise, if “wrong” and “improper” mean largely the same thing, see Pet. Br. 15 &
n.5, and if any defective forum is a “wrong ‘venue,’”
ibid., then Rule 12(b)(3) would render 12(b)(1) and (2)
unnecessary—“lack of subject-matter jurisdiction”
and “lack of personal jurisdiction” would both just be
species of “improper venue.”
Section 1406—like the rest of Title 28, Chapter
87—is about venue, not jurisdiction or other defects.
And a case brought where § 1391(b) says it “may be
brought” does not “lay[] venue in the wrong division
or district.” § 1406(a).
C. Parties cannot render a proper venue
improper by contract.
Alternatively, Atlantic Marine portrays forumselection clauses as displacing standard venue
analysis through the parties’ consent. Pet. Br. 12.
That is not how venue works.
As this Court has explained, “personal
jurisdiction [and] venue * * * are personal privileges
of the defendant” against suit. Leroy, 443 U.S. at 180.
These privileges, of course, “may be waived by the
parties.” Ibid.; cf. Pet. Br. 11–12. But neither privilege may be expanded by the parties, because the
scope of each privilege is determined by law. In other
words, a party may consent to venue or jurisdiction
as a potential defendant, giving up its right to assert
certain legally defined privileges later. But that party
cannot, as a potential plaintiff, “give up” the fact that
venue lies in a given district—any more than it can

10
“give up,” in advance, the district court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See The Bremen, 407
U.S. at 12 (“No one seriously contends * * * that the
forum-selection clause ‘ousted’ the District Court of
jurisdiction * * * .”); cf. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 80, cmt. a (rev. ed. 1988) (“Private individuals have no power to alter the rules of judicial
jurisdiction.”).
A party may also waive individual arguments
about venue. One judge of the court of appeals
described the parties as agreeing “that neither will
seek to maintain venue” in certain fora. Pet. App. 17a
(Haynes, J., concurring in the judgment). But even if
venue were J-Crew’s burden to “maintain” (it may
not be),5 nothing in the parties’ agreement estops JCrew from “maintain[ing]” venue wherever venue
lies. The agreement promises that a dispute “shall be
litigated in” Norfolk and consents to jurisdiction and
venue there. J.A. 28. It makes no representations
about venue in other districts, any more than about
personal or subject-matter jurisdiction; and if it had,
reliance would have been unreasonable in light of
§ 1391. Even a contract choosing a particular forum
and reciting that venue is improper in every other
district would not necessarily make it so. A court is
There is another circuit split on which party bears the burden
of establishing proper or improper venue. Compare, e.g., Gulf
Ins. Co. v. Glasbrenner, 417 F.3d 353, 355 (CA2 2005) (plaintiff’s
burden), with In re Peachtree Lane Assocs., 150 F.3d 788, 792
(CA7 1998) (defendant’s burden); Myers v. Am. Dental Ass’n,
695 F.2d 716, 724–25 (CA3 1982) (same); see also 2 Moore’s
Federal Practice § 12.32[4], at 66; 17 id. § 110.01[5][c], at 22.
5

11
“not bound to accept, as controlling, [the parties’]
stipulations as to questions of law,” Sanford’s Estate
v. CIR, 308 U.S. 39, 51 (1939)—especially when the
correct answers to those questions are obvious from
the face of the complaint.
Perhaps J-Crew is equitably estopped from suing
in other courts more generally. See Staring, Forgotten Equity: The Enforcement of Forum Clauses, 30 J.
Mar. L. & Com. 405 (1999); see also Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 580 (1879) (“[H]e who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would
not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted.”). But that simply proves
the point—for estoppel, in that sense, is not a defect
in venue, but rather an affirmative defense. See Rule
8(c)(1) (“estoppel”).
Again, Atlantic Marine’s argument as to venue
would work just as well (or poorly) for jurisdiction.
This Court has said that the party asserting
jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. See
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 &
n.3 (2006) (subject-matter jurisdiction); Ins. Corp. of
Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 709 (1982) (personal jurisdiction). A
prior agreement not to “maintain” jurisdiction, no
matter how obvious the law, does not cause
jurisdiction to be absent through a failure of proof.
Otherwise, the parties could “oust” the courts’
jurisdiction in precisely the way that The Bremen
rejected. Given that parties cannot strip courts of
jurisdiction by contract, they cannot strip judicial
districts of statutorily specified venue either.
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Forum-selection clauses therefore have no more
to do with “venue”—other than in the loose sense of
“place”—than they do with personal or subjectmatter jurisdiction. Objections based on such clauses
fit no better under Rule 12(b)(3) or § 1406 than they
do under Rule 12(b)(1) or (2)—that is, not at all.
II. An Enforceable Forum-Selection Clause
May Be Raised as an Affirmative Defense.
According to J-Crew, if a forum-selection clause
does not destroy proper venue, then the only remedy
left for the plaintiff’s breach of the clause is a
transfer motion under § 1404. BIO 11.6
That does not follow. Forum-selection clauses are
not an unprovided-for case under the Federal Rules.
Rather, the Rules already specify the correct
enforcement procedure: a forum-selection clause
must be raised as an affirmative defense.
A. The Rules already provide a method for
raising forum-selection defenses.
An exclusive forum-selection clause is exactly
what it sounds like: a contractual agreement that
consents to litigation in a particular forum and relinquishes the parties’ right to select any other forum.
The exclusive nature of the clause makes it a form of
waiver, “the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” Wood v. Milyard, 132 S.
Ct. 1826, 1835 (2012) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540
U.S. 443, 458 n.13 (2004)). If the clause is valid and
Or, perhaps, a separate suit for damages. See Pet. App. 25a
n.5 (Haynes, J., concurring in the judgment).
6
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enforceable, it serves as a defense to the plaintiff’s
claim. Specifically, it is an affirmative defense—a
reason to deny judgment to the plaintiff that remains
valid “even if all the allegations in the complaint are
true,” Black’s Law Dictionary 482 (B. Garner ed., 9th
ed. 2009), or that the defendant “cannot raise by a
simple denial in the answer,” 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 1271, at
585 (3d ed. 2004) (Wright & Miller).
Under the general default established by Rule 8,
“any avoidance or affirmative defense” must be “affirmatively state[d]” in the defendant’s answer. Rule
8(c)(1) (emphasis added).7 This is the standard method for raising defenses under the Rules: except for
seven special defenses that may be raised “by motion,” “[e]very defense to a claim for relief * * * must
be asserted in the responsive pleading.” Rule 12(b)
(emphasis added). Were there any doubt, the Rules
also provide examples of affirmative defenses, with
“waiver” specifically included on the list. Rule 8(c)(1).
That a forum-selection clause offers an affirmative defense does not mean, however, that a defendant must always go to trial to enforce it. When a forum-selection clause raises “no genuine dispute as to
any material fact”—say, because its authenticity is
undisputed, and the only disagreements involve pure
questions of law—the defendant may immediately
Cf. Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, at 156, 339 (defining
“avoidance,” under “confession and avoidance,” as “[a] plea in
which a defendant admits allegations but pleads additional
facts that deprive the admitted facts of an adverse legal effect”).
7
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file a motion for summary judgment under Rule
56(a). There is no waiting period for summary judgment motions; the defendant can file one contemporaneously with its answer, if it wishes. See Rule
56(b); cf. Advisory Committee’s Notes, 28 U.S.C. app.
at 268 (2006).8
In many cases (including this one), the defendant
will not even need to answer the complaint, because
the case can be dismissed by pre-answer motion under Rule 12(b)(6). “A complaint is subject to dismissal
for failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as
true, show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief”—such
as “when an affirmative defense . . . appears on its
face.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted; omission in original).
For Rule 12(b)(6) purposes, the complaint’s allegations include material “incorporated into the complaint by reference.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). In most contract cases, the parties’ agreement is “integral to the
claim,” and it will be attached to the complaint as an
exhibit “whose authenticity is unquestioned”—
making it “part of [the] complaint by implication.” 5B
Wright & Miller § 1357, at 376; id. at 186 (Supp.
2013). That permits enforcement of the clause
through Rule 12(b)(6), or alternatively through a

Should that motion be denied, nothing in the Federal Rules
stops the defendant from filing another summary judgment motion on the merits later on. Courts often accept successive summary judgment motions when there is good cause to do so. See
11 Moore § 56.121[1][b], at 300 & n.5.
8
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Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. See
Rule 12(h)(2)(B); 5C Wright & Miller § 1367, at 207.
Thus, while the particular motion filed depends
on the contents of the complaint, the Rules leave little doubt about the general approach. A forumselection clause should be processed in the same
manner as any other defense that justifies the denial
of relief but that is not specifically listed in Rule
12(b).
Indeed, this is the same procedure that defendants must use to enforce various other rights not to
litigate—for example, because they have already settled the plaintiff’s claim, or already resolved the issue
in arbitration, or even already litigated the claim or
issue to judgment in a prior case and won. “Release,”
“arbitration and award,” “res judicata,” and “estoppel” are all affirmative defenses under Rule 8(c)(1).
Unless these defenses are apparent from the complaint or matters for judicial notice, defendants cannot make them under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) and must
resort to summary judgment or trial. Yet the default
procedures of the Federal Rules still protect such defendants from unjustified litigation.
In the same way, these default procedures provide parties that have agreed on a particular forum
with the full measure of certainty and predictability
described by The Bremen. See 407 U.S. at 13–14. If
the case is filed in the wrong forum, the defendant
has a right to have it dismissed, and an adequate
procedure under the Federal Rules for enforcing that
right.
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B. This Court’s decisions are best read as
treating a forum-selection clause as an
affirmative defense.
Treating a forum-selection clause as an
affirmative defense is consistent not only with the
text of the Rules but also with this Court’s
jurisprudence. The Court has repeatedly stated that
forum-selection clauses can justify dismissal, but it
has never suggested that they do so by rendering
venue improper. The Court did enforce a forumselection clause in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), in which the original
motion for summary judgment had asserted a venue
defect under § 1406, see Shute v. Carnival Cruise
Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 379, 387 (CA9 1988). But the
Court’s opinion never mentioned either § 1406 or the
word “venue,” and it can hardly be read as endorsing
that theory.9
By contrast, in Stewart Organization, Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp., the Court approvingly noted the parties’
understanding that a § 1406 motion to dismiss “for
improper venue” had been “properly denied * * * [,]
because respondent apparently does business in the
[district].” 487 U.S. 22, 27 n.8 (1988). Atlantic Marine
portrays this statement as a mere summary of the
Likewise, in Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp.,
the Court enforced a forum-selection clause without specifying
what motion had been filed in the district court. See 130 S. Ct.
2433, 2440 (2010). The Court’s only discussion of venue was in
explaining that the statutory venue provisions of the Carmack
Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 11706(d), did not apply to that case.
See 130 S. Ct. at 2441–42.
9
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parties’ positions, Pet. Br. 23. But the Court’s words
in Stewart carry far more weight than its silence
about the proper motion in Shute. The Stewart Court
recognized that statutory venue would lie
irrespective of what the parties had agreed.
Moreover, rather than suggesting that forumselection clauses render venue improper, this Court
has traditionally described such clauses as conferring
a contractual right to dismissal. Although the
petitioner in The Bremen had originally “moved to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,” 407 U.S. at 4, the
Court rejected any jurisdictional “ouste[r]” theory,
see id. at 12, and instead framed the issue as one of
specific performance of the contract: “The correct
approach would have been to enforce the forum
clause specifically * * * .” Id. at 15.
Similarly, in Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser. the
Court described the defendant as having a “contractual right to [a particular] forum,” 490 U.S. 495, 499
(1989), and as seeking to have its “agreement * * *
enforced by the federal courts,” id. at 501. (The petitioner in Lauro Lines had originally filed a motion to
dismiss “pursuant to Rules 12(b) and 56.” Appendix
in No. 88-23, pp. 2–3.) The Court repeated this depiction in Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct,
Inc., where it described the forum-selection clause in
Lauro Lines as conferring a “contractual right to limit trial to [a particular] forum.” 511 U.S. 863, 874
(1994).
The Court has also explained that the
contractual right conferred by a forum-selection
clause justifies dismissal rather than transfer to
another court. In Lauro Lines, the Court noted that a
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district court’s failure to respect the clause would be
reversible error, which may be raised on “appeal
after final judgment” just like “a claim that the trial
court lacked personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.” 490 U.S. at 501; see also id. at 502–03
(Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the remedy for an
erroneously denied motion as “permitting the trial to
occur and reversing its outcome”). Because this
contractual right can preclude the defendant’s
liability without necessarily contradicting the
plaintiff’s complaint, it must be raised as an
affirmative defense.10

Some courts of appeals have adopted a similar approach. In
Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., the Third
Circuit described a forum-selection clause as “merely
constitut[ing] a stipulation,” whereby “the parties join in asking
the court to give effect to their agreement.” 367 F.2d 341, 345
(CA3 1966). That case arose on a 12(b)(6) motion, which the
Third Circuit properly converted to a motion for summary
judgment under Rule 56. See id. at 343. The First Circuit then
relied on Central Contracting when it endorsed the use of a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, see LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pac. Sewer Maint.
Corp., 739 F.2d 4, 6–7 (CA1 1984), and it has maintained that
rule to this day, see Rivera v. Centro Médico de Turabo, Inc.,
575 F.3d 10, 15–16 (CA1 2009); Silva v. Encyclopedia
Britannica Inc., 239 F.3d 385, 387–88 (CA1 2001); cf. Langley v.
Prudential Mortg. Capital Co., 546 F.3d 365 (CA6 2008) (per
curiam) (permitting 12(b)(6) or § 1404); 14D Wright § 3803.1, at
112 & n.72 (3d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2013) (“The better view * * * is
that a forum selection clause does not render venue improper in
an otherwise proper forum and that a valid clause should be
enforced by either a Section 1404(a) transfer or a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”) (citing cases).
10
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C. The affirmative-defense procedure is
practical as well as correct.
On a natural reading of the Rules, forumselection clauses must be raised as affirmative defenses. Surprisingly, few courts and commentators
have mounted serious arguments to the contrary.
Some have failed to consider the affirmative-defense
theory, assuming § 1404 to be the only alternative to
a venue approach. See, e.g., Pet. App. 5a. Others have
dismissed the theory out of hand based on a misreading of Stewart.11 Most, however, have rejected it for
reasons unrelated to the text, preferring to use venue
concepts based on an imagined balance of practical
costs and benefits—reasons to call the issue venue,
even if it isn’t. See, e.g., Sucampo Pharms., Inc. v.
Astellas Pharma, Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 549 (CA4 2006);
Argueta v. Banco Mexicano, S.A., 87 F.3d 320, 324
(CA9 1996); see also Pet. App. 24a (Haynes, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (searching for “the
cleanest way” to enforce the clause); cf. Pet. Br. 17–
18.12
See, e.g., Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d
1285, 1290 (CA11 1998) (finding “no significant doctrinal error”
in using Rule 12(b)(6), but preferring 12(b)(3) based on the non
sequitur that Stewart arose under § 1404, a “transfer-of-venue
statute”).
11

See also, e.g., 17 Moore § 111.04[3][b][i]–[ii], [4][c], at 39–43,
52.3–.6; Davies, Forum Selection Clauses in Maritime Cases, 27
Tul. Mar. L.J. 367, 369–72, 375 (2003); Staring, supra, at 408;
Holt, Note, A Uniform System for the Enforceability of Forum
Selection Clauses in Federal Courts, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1913,
1924–25 (2009).
12
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The Rules do set out a number of procedures for
handling venue that might be convenient if applied to
forum-selection clauses. For example, venue
objections:
•

may be raised before answering the complaint,
see Rule 12(b)(3);

•

may rely on evidence outside the complaint, see
Rule 12(d);

•

are waived if raised too late, see Rule 12(h)(1);

•

have contested facts determined by the court, not
a jury, see Rule 43(c); and

•

result in dismissals that are not “on the merits,”
Rule 41(b).

Even on their own practical terms, however, these
concerns are largely overblown or misguided. And, in
any case, they offer no reason to ignore the Federal
Rules.
Timing. Treating a forum-selection clause as an
affirmative defense may seem like a catch-22. The
defendant still has to answer the complaint in the
plaintiff’s chosen forum, properly stating the defense
under Rule 8(c)(1), just to assert its right not to litigate there in the first place.
But this sells the pleading process short. As noted above, the Rules expect just the same of defendants that have already settled the case, completed an
arbitration, or litigated the case to judgment and
won. See Rule 8(c)(1) (listing “release,” “arbitration
and award,” “res judicata,” and “estoppel”). Each of
these defenses presents just as much need for certainty and repose as does a forum-selection clause. If
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a defendant that has already settled the case still has
to file an answer and a summary judgment motion,
then that is not too much to expect from a defendant
that merely claims the contractual right to litigate in
a different forum.
In most forum-selection cases, moreover, the
agreement is incorporated in the complaint, and the
defendant may move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
before filing an answer. Sometimes the parties might
have entered into a wholly separate agreement on
forum selection, which likely would not be so incorporated. But even if the defendant has to use summary
judgment, Rule 56(b) places no limit on how early
such a motion may be brought. Given that Shute itself arose on a motion for summary judgment, see
499 U.S. at 588, it is hard to portray this procedure
as inadequate.
Evidence. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court
assumes the truth of the complaint’s well-pleaded
allegations, and will not accept other evidence
without converting the motion to one for summary
judgment under Rule 56. Two courts of appeals have
relied on these grounds to find Rule 12(b)(6)
inappropriate for forum selection—reasoning that, in
order to attack the clause under The Bremen’s
standards (e.g., for fraud), the plaintiff will usually
need to cite evidence outside the complaint. See
Argueta, 87 F.2d at 324; accord Sucampo, 471 F.3d at
549; Pet. Br. 18.
This objection proves too much. A plaintiff might
need extra-complaint evidence whenever an
affirmative defense is asserted under Rule 12(b)(6).
Consider a statute of limitations defense: the
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defendant might have agreed to waive that defense
in an earlier proceeding, see, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co.
v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 242 (1981), and evidence of
that waiver would almost always be outside the
complaint. Any need for outside evidence is easily
handled under Rule 12(d), which provides the parties
with a “reasonable opportunity” to develop and
present the facts.13
Indeed, conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
summary judgment under Rules 12(d) and 56 is
hardly a catastrophe. If there were a true factual
dispute over the validity of the clause—say, whether
it had been inserted by fraud, or whether the
plaintiff’s signature on the agreement was forged—
then facts will need to be gathered, whether through
“jurisdictional discovery” or actual discovery. Calling
the forum-selection question “venue” does not make
the factual problem go away. Federal courts can and
should structure discovery to answer the forumselection question first, before digging into the merits
as a whole. See Rules 16(b), 26(b)(2)(C).
Waiver. A venue defect must be raised in the
answer or pre-answer motion or else it is waived.
Alternatively, if the complaint happens to anticipate an alternative defense (say, by alleging that the forum-selection clause
was inserted by fraud), and those allegations are not struck as
surplusage, see 5 Wright & Miller § 1276, at 623–24, then taking the allegations as true is obviously the right thing to do on a
12(b)(6) motion. The pleaded fact is plainly in dispute, and it is
reasonable for the court to expect affidavits or admissible evidence on the subject before enforcing the clause. See Rule
56(c)(2), (4).
13
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Rule 12(h)(1). By contrast, failure to state a claim—
once pleaded in the answer—may be raised by motion
for judgment on the pleadings or even “at trial.” Rule
12(b), (h)(2)(B)–(C). That might seem inappropriate
for forum selection: if a case truly belongs somewhere
else, the defendant should not wait for a full-blown
trial before pressing the issue. See Pet. Br. 17–18.
That objection misconceives the waiver rule. Defendants waive venue under Rule 12(h)(1)(A) only by
filing Rule 12(b) motions on other grounds. Nothing
stops them from pleading improper venue in the answer and then waiting to press it at trial. See Rule
12(h)(1)(B)(ii). Mislabeling forum selection as venue,
then, hardly guarantees a quick resolution.
More importantly, whatever the procedural vehicle used, a defendant’s right to raise a waiver defense
(including a forum-selection clause) is itself limited
by ordinary waiver doctrines. An affirmative defense
is waived if not pleaded in the answer. See Rule
8(c)(1); 2 Moore § 8.08[3], at 62. And a defendant can
waive defenses by its conduct, as well as by formal
omission. See Democratic Republic of Congo v. FG
Hemisphere Assocs., 508 F.3d 1062, 1064–65 (CADC
2007) (citing cases). For example, when parties have
agreed to arbitration but the plaintiff sues anyway, 9
U.S.C. § 3 imposes no time limit on the defendant’s
motion to compel arbitration. But a defendant that
waits too long to file, acting inconsistently with its
arbitration right by continuing to litigate in the
plaintiff’s chosen forum, may be found to have waived
that right. 13D Wright § 3569, at 526–28 & nn.83–84
(3d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2013); see also Moses H. Cone
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25
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(1983) (describing “waiver” and “delay” as “defense[s]
to arbitrability”). The same is true of a late-filed forum non conveniens motion. 14D Wright § 3828, at
627 & n.17.
So here. A defendant that waits too long to demand its chosen forum, preferring to litigate in the
forum the plaintiff picked, will waive its right to litigate elsewhere. See, e.g., Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56
F.3d 825, 830–31 (CA7 1995). Courts have long enforced this standard as a matter of equity in the contexts of arbitration or forum non conveniens, even
without the hard-and-fast limits of Rule 12(h)(1). Because equitable waiver doctrines continue to apply, it
is hard to imagine circumstances in which a defendant could successfully “lie behind the log” and delay
the enforcement of a forum-selection clause.
Jury trial. When venue is raised by motion, any
facts relevant to the defense are determined by the
court, usually on affidavits. See Rule 43(c); 14D
Wright § 3826, at 555 & n.20. By contrast, if an
affirmative defense presents a genuine dispute of
material fact, it cannot be resolved by motion under
Rules 12 or 56. If the case is jury-eligible and a party
so demands, the issue has to go to the jury. See Rules
38, 39(a). Why should the parties have to endure a
jury trial, just to find out where they should start the
litigation?
This procedure may seem strange. See Pet. Br.
17–18. But every reason supporting jury trials in
general also supports such a right here. If the
validity and enforceability of a forum-selection clause
rests on genuinely disputed facts—say, whether the
plaintiff ever signed the agreement in the first
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place—then the plaintiff may have a right to have
those facts determined by a jury, not a judge. (Under
the Federal Arbitration Act, by comparison, “[i]f the
making of the arbitration agreement * * * be in issue,” then the matter may have to be resolved by jury
trial, 9 U.S.C. § 4—even though a crucial goal of arbitration is to obtain speedy process outside the
courts.)
Most of the time, of course, there will not be any
relevant facts in dispute (as here), or the dispute over
those facts will not be genuine. In such cases, the
clause’s validity can be resolved quickly by the court
on motion rather than by a jury. And even when
there are genuine disputes, the parties would not
have to wait for a trial of the whole cause, as a district court can and should order a separate trial under Rule 42(b).
Merits. The most fundamental objection to treating forum-selection clauses as affirmative defenses is
that defenses ought to concern the merits, while forum selection concerns only the place of suit. Pet. Br.
18. And theoretical scruples aside, there are practical
differences as well. A dismissal based on an
affirmative defense, unlike one for venue, typically
“operates as an adjudication on the merits.” Rule
41(b). But not every plaintiff, having been kicked out
for going to the wrong court, should be forever
foreclosed from going to the right court.
In fact, this dismissal issue is a red herring. A
court can always issue a dismissal without prejudice
if it chooses. See ibid. (“Unless the dismissal order
states otherwise, * * * .”). Moreover, for purposes of
the Civil Rules, an “adjudication on the merits” un-
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der Rule 41 means only that the plaintiff cannot “return[] later, to the same court, with the same underlying claim.” Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505 (2001) (emphasis added).
Whether that is “sufficient” to bar the claim in other
courts does not depend on Rule 41, but on the ordinarily applicable doctrines of preclusion—which
might differ based on the forum State or the circumstances of the case, “by direction of this Court.” Id. at
506–07.14
More generally, there is nothing strange about
viewing forum selection as a defense to liability in a
particular court. One may have a substantive right—
even a nonwaivable right—“to impose liability” on
another, without having a similar right to “suit in all
competent courts.” CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,
132 S. Ct. 665, 671 (2012) (emphasis omitted). Like
venue or personal jurisdiction, forum selection is a
For example, “[a]t common law dismissal on a ground not going to the merits was not ordinarily a bar to a subsequent action
on the same claim.” Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 285
(1961) (addressing dismissals based on preconditions to suit). A
forum-selection dismissal, like a dismissal for forum non conveniens, arguably “‘den[ies] audience to a case on the merits,’”
deciding only “that the merits should be adjudicated elsewhere.”
Sinochem Int’l v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping, 549 U.S. 422, 432
(2007) (alteration in original; quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon
Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999)). On the other hand, if a defendant has already “been put to the trouble of preparing his
defense,” then barring future actions by the plaintiff may be
appropriate. See Costello, 265 U.S. at 287; accord Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 20, cmt. n (1982) (noting that “estoppel
or laches” may bar a second suit when “it would be plainly unfair to subject the defendant to a second action”).
14
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good defense in some districts but not others. But
unlike those defenses, it is has not been given a
special status under Rule 12(b).
*

*

*

Even if it were more convenient to treat forum
selection the way we treat personal jurisdiction or
venue, the only lawful method of doing so is to amend
the Federal Rules. The Court, acting under § 2072,
could always add a new Rule 12(b)(8) defense—
“violation of a forum-selection clause”—which could
be raised by pre-answer motion, subject to waiver
under Rule 12(h), and included among the non-merits
grounds in Rule 41(b).
No matter how efficient, however, “such a result
‘must be obtained by the process of amending the
Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.’”
Jones, 549 U.S. at 217 (quoting Leatherman v.
Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)). Amendments to the
Rules require various procedural formalities,
designed to secure important substantive interests.
See §§ 2073–2074. Courts should not leapfrog this
process by skipping over the statutory text and
mislabeling forum-selection clauses as “venue.” The
Rules treat such clauses, by default, as affirmative
defenses; and until that changes, “federal courts and
litigants must rely on summary judgment and control
of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner
rather than later.” Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168–69.
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III. The Court Should Assume that the Clause
Is Enforceable, Identify the Correct Procedure, Vacate the Judgment, and Leave Remaining Issues To Be Addressed on Remand.
Atlantic Marine and J-Crew agreed that a
dispute like this one “shall be litigated” in Norfolk,
Va. J.A. 28. The contractual provision embodying
that agreement was attached to and incorporated in
J-Crew’s complaint. J.A. 7–39. If the clause is valid
and enforceable, then the complaint on its face
revealed a reason why the court in which it was filed
(namely, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Texas) should not grant relief. In other
words, the complaint “fail[ed] to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted,” and could have been
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
The facts of this case, however, raise two
complications that the Court may wish to avoid.
First, the case arises under state law, and there
is much uncertainty over which body of law governs
the enforcement of forum-selection clauses under
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Because the case may be decided without resolving
that question, the Court should assume, without
deciding, that the clause is valid and enforceable
under the relevant body of law.
Second, Atlantic Marine made its Rule 12(b)
motion under the label of venue, not failure to state a
claim. Whether that was adequate to preserve the
issue should be left to the court of appeals to decide
in the first instance. That court issued its judgment
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on the erroneous assumption that § 1404 transfer
was the only available remedy. Pet. App. 5a. The
judgment should therefore be vacated and the case
remanded for further proceedings.
A. The Court should assume, without
deciding, that the clause at issue here is
valid and enforceable.
Atlantic Marine assumes that the enforcement of
a forum-selection clause in federal court (even in a
diversity case) is governed by federal law, and in particular by the standards enunciated in The Bremen.
See Pet. Br. 5, 13, 17. That is a controversial position,
and the Court need not adopt it here.
Most private contracts containing forumselection clauses are governed by state law. The
Court has never decided whether the enforcement of
a forum-selection clause on a state-law claim is
likewise a matter of state contract law, cf. Stewart,
487 U.S. at 38–41 (Scalia, J., dissenting)—and, if so,
of which State, see Mullenix, Another Choice of
Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57
Fordham L. Rev. 291, 332–39 (1988)—or whether it
is so “essential” to the federal courts as to require a
federal answer, cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).15 This Erie question
In Ferens v. John Deere Co., a parenthetical dictum described
Stewart as “holding that federal law determines the validity of a
forum selection clause.” 494 U.S. 516, 526 (1990). That dictum
must be understood in context, namely as explaining how
§ 1404 effectively “pre-empt[s] state law” by enabling transfers
among federal courts that would be impossible in a state
15

30
needs answering regardless of the procedural device
employed, contra Pet. Br. 18 n.6, and it has produced
yet another split among the courts of appeals.16 The
Court has also never expressly stated whether, if
federal law applies, the relevant standards are those
identified in The Bremen and Shute—which were
both admiralty cases and which limited their
analysis accordingly. See Shute, 499 U.S. at 590
(“[T]his is a case in admiralty, and federal law
governs the enforceability of the forum-selection
clause we scrutinize.”); The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10
(“We believe this is the correct doctrine to be followed
by federal district courts sitting in admiralty.”).
Here, J-Crew asserts claims solely under Texas
system. 494 U.S. at 526. Stewart deliberately sidestepped the
Erie issue, because the case happened to arise on a § 1404
motion, which applies a different legal standard under which
the clause is merely one more fact to consider. See 487 U.S. at
28–29. Even a clause that is wholly unenforceable under the
relevant law—say, because that law requires special formalities,
like the signatures of seven witnesses in red ink—might still be
a “significant factor” in the § 1404 analysis if it adequately
reflects “the parties’ private expression of their venue
preferences,” id. at 29–30. Likewise, even a clause that is fully
binding on the parties might not justify § 1404 transfer if the
relevant public-interest factors counsel against it. See id. at 30–
31; Pet. Br. 25. Because § 1404 applies the same multifactor
analysis to federal- and state-law claims, Stewart did not need
to answer the Erie question, and so it did not. See 487 U.S. at 26
n.3.
Compare, e.g., Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 628
F.3d 643, 650 (CA4 2010) (federal law), with IFC Credit Corp. v.
United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 991
(CA7 2008) (state law).
16
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law. J.A. 9–14. Unlike in Stewart, there is no federal
statute or rule to apply. Fortunately, however, the
Court need not “wade into Erie’s murky waters” yet.
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437. The district court
found the forum-selection clause to be consistent with
Texas contract law, see Pet. App. 31a, and J-Crew
chose not to contest that determination in the court
of appeals, see Response to Petition for Writ of
Mandamus in No. 12-50826 (CA5), pp. 10–13, or in
its brief in opposition. (J-Crew claimed that Texas
has “a strong interest in having local construction
disputes decided [there],” and cited the state statute
the district court found inapplicable, but it declined
to argue that Texas law actually forbids enforcement.
BIO 4 n.2 (citing Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 272.001).
Nor did J-Crew argue that the clause was invalid or
unenforceable under federal standards. See BIO 10–
11. Under this Court’s Rule 15.2, J-Crew has
forfeited any argument that the clause is
unenforceable.
For the purposes of this case, then, the Court
may assume that the clause is valid and enforceable,
whether or not federal courts should generally apply
The Bremen’s standards to state-law claims—or even
to federal claims outside admiralty.
B. The Court should leave all preservation
issues for the court of appeals in the
first instance.
As noted above, Atlantic Marine framed its
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3) rather than
12(b)(6). J-Crew accordingly argues that a 12(b)(6)
theory—and, presumably, the affirmative-defense
procedure more generally—is “not properly before the
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Court on the merits.” BIO 2 n.1; see id. at 12–13 &
n.6. Because the label of the motion does not always
control, these preservation issues should be left for
the court of appeals to decide in the first instance.
Atlantic Marine’s Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss
argued that J-Crew’s suit violates a valid and
enforceable forum-selection clause. J.A. 48–50. The
substance of those arguments would be the same
regardless of which 12(b) label they bore. When
enforcing forum-selection clauses in motions to
dismiss, appellate courts are not always “bound by
the label employed below”—especially given the
confused state of the law. Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d
1110, 1112 n.1 (CA1 1993). The court of appeals had
previously held that, “[a]s a general matter, the
caption on a pleading does not constrain the court’s
treatment of a pleading,” and it has applied this
principle to construe motions without regard to their
captions. N. Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. City of San
Juan, 90 F.3d 910, 918 (CA5 1996) (per curiam) (Rule
59(e) motion).17 It could equally have chosen to do so
here.
The court of appeals did not consider this
possibility, in part because it “agree[d]” with the
district court that “when a forum-selection clause
designates a specific federal forum * * * , a motion to
transfer under § 1404(a) is the proper procedural
Cf. 5C Wright & Miller § 1378, at 380 (“In accordance with
the basic philosophy of the federal rules, the general attitude of
the courts has been that a Rule 12(e) motion need not be filed
under a technically correct label for it to be considered as one by
the court.”).
17

33
mechanism for enforcing the clause.” Pet. App. 5a.
But if Atlantic Marine would be entitled to dismissal,
this Court may vacate a judgment founded on an
“erroneous view to the contrary.” United States v.
Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2330–31
(2011). The court of appeals may then decide, on a
correct view of the law, whether to look past the
caption and engage the substance of Atlantic
Marine’s original motion. As this is a Court of
“review, not of first view,” FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 529 (2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted), it is enough for this Court
to identify the proper procedure, vacate the
judgment, and remand the case to the court of
appeals.18
Atlantic Marine has not relied on the
affirmative-defense procedure in its brief to this
Court. See Pet. Br. 17–18. Yet the Court may still
frame the legal issues properly, whether or not that
framing is urged by the parties. “When an issue or
claim is properly before the court, the court is not
limited to the particular legal theories advanced by
the parties, but rather retains the independent power
to identify and apply the proper construction of
governing law.” Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc.,
500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991). And when an argument falls
squarely within the Question Presented and is hardly
That court may also consider, e.g., whether this relabeling is
appropriate on a petition for mandamus, see Cheney v. U.S.
Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004), or whether any error in
the district court could be adequately remedied on appeal, see
Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 501.
18
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“foreign to the parties,” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
300 (1989) (plurality opinion), it is no barrier that the
argument is presented only by an amicus curiae. See
id.; see also, e.g., Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S.
299, 309–10 (1999).
If possible, the Court should correctly resolve the
multidirectional circuit split that necessitated the
grant of certiorari. If the Court is reluctant to discuss
the
affirmative-defense
procedure,
amicus
respectfully urges that the Court make that
reluctance explicit. An opinion that does no more
than find Rule 12(b)(3) or § 1406 motions
inappropriate, without explicitly clarifying what
other procedures might still be available, will at best
leave portions of the many-sided split in place. At
worst, it may be misunderstood as endorsing
§ 1404—or a separate suit for damages—as the only
available means of relief.19

Because Atlantic Marine requested dismissal, not just transfer, the Court should reach these issues regardless of how it
resolves the second Question Presented. No matter how
favorable the burden of proof, limiting the remedy to § 1404
effectively rewards a plaintiff’s breach of contract. Pet. Br. 20.
19
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.
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28 U.S.C. § 1390
Scope
(a) VENUE DEFINED.—As used in this chapter,
the term ‘‘venue’’ refers to the geographic
specification of the proper court or courts for the
litigation of a civil action that is within the subjectmatter jurisdiction of the district courts in general,
and does not refer to any grant or restriction of
subject-matter jurisdiction providing for a civil action
to be adjudicated only by the district court for a
particular district or districts.
(b) EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN CASES.—Except as
otherwise provided by law, this chapter shall not
govern the venue of a civil action in which the district
court exercises the jurisdiction conferred by section
1333, except that such civil actions may be
transferred between district courts as provided in
this chapter.
(c) CLARIFICATION REGARDING CASES REMOVED
FROM STATE COURTS.—This chapter shall not
determine the district court to which a civil action
pending in a State court may be removed, but shall
govern the transfer of an action so removed as
between districts and divisions of the United States
district courts.
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28 U.S.C § 1391
Venue generally
(a) APPLICABILITY OF SECTION.—Except
otherwise provided by law—

as

(1) this section shall govern the venue of all
civil actions brought in district courts of the
United States; and
(2) the proper venue for a civil action shall
be determined without regard to whether the
action is local or transitory in nature.
(b) VENUE
brought in—

IN

GENERAL.—A civil action may be

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant
resides, if all defendants are residents of the
State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the
claim occurred, or a substantial part of property
that is the subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action
may otherwise be brought as provided in this
section, any judicial district in which any
defendant is subject to the court’s personal
jurisdiction with respect to such action.
(c) RESIDENCY.—For all venue purposes—
(1) a natural person, including an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the
United States, shall be deemed to reside in the
judicial district in which that person is
domiciled;
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(2) an entity with the capacity to sue and be
sued in its common name under applicable law,
whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to
reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in
which such defendant is subject to the court’s
personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil
action in question and, if a plaintiff, only in the
judicial district in which it maintains its
principal place of business; and
(3) a defendant not resident in the United
States may be sued in any judicial district, and
the joinder of such a defendant shall be
disregarded in determining where the action
may be brought with respect to other defendants.
(d) RESIDENCY OF CORPORATIONS IN STATES WITH
MULTIPLE DISTRICTS.—For purposes of venue under
this chapter, in a State which has more than one
judicial district and in which a defendant that is a
corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction at the
time an action is commenced, such corporation shall
be deemed to reside in any district in that State
within which its contacts would be sufficient to
subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were
a separate State, and, if there is no such district, the
corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district
within which it has the most significant contacts.
(e) ACTIONS WHERE DEFENDANT IS OFFICER
EMPLOYEE OF THE UNITED STATES.—

OR

(1) IN GENERAL.—A civil action in which a
defendant is an officer or employee of the United
States or any agency thereof acting in his official
capacity or under color of legal authority, or an
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agency of the United States, or the United
States, may, except as otherwise provided by
law, be brought in any judicial district in which
(A) a defendant in the action resides, (B) a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part
of property that is the subject of the action is
situated, or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real
property is involved in the action. Additional
persons may be joined as parties to any such
action in accordance with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and with such other venue
requirements as would be applicable if the
United States or one of its officers, employees, or
agencies were not a party.
(2) SERVICE.—The summons and complaint
in such an action shall be served as provided by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that
the delivery of the summons and complaint to
the officer or agency as required by the rules
may be made by certified mail beyond the
territorial limits of the district in which the
action is brought.
(f) CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST A FOREIGN STATE.—A
civil action against a foreign state as defined in
section 1603(a) of this title may be brought—
(1) in any judicial district in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part
of property that is the subject of the action is
situated;
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(2) in any judicial district in which the vessel
or cargo of a foreign state is situated, if the claim
is asserted under section 1605(b) of this title;
(3) in any judicial district in which the
agency or instrumentality is licensed to do
business or is doing business, if the action is
brought against an agency or instrumentality of
a foreign state as defined in section 1603(b) of
this title; or
(4) in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia if the action is brought
against a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof.
(g) MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM LITIGATION.—A
civil action in which jurisdiction of the district court
is based upon section 1369 of this title may be
brought in any district in which any defendant
resides or in which a substantial part of the accident
giving rise to the action took place.
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28 U.S.C. § 1406
Cure or waiver of defects
(a) The district court of a district in which is filed
a case laying venue in the wrong division or district
shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice,
transfer such case to any district or division in which
it could have been brought.
(b) Nothing in this chapter shall impair the
jurisdiction of a district court of any matter involving
a party who does not interpose timely and sufficient
objection to the venue.
(c) As used in this section, the term ‘‘district
court’’ includes the District Court of Guam, the
District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, and
the District Court of the Virgin Islands, and the term
‘‘district’’ includes the territorial jurisdiction of each
such court.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 8
General Rules of Pleading
(a) CLAIM FOR RELIEF. A pleading that states a
claim for relief must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the
court already has jurisdiction and the claim
needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which
may include relief in the alternative or different
types of relief.
(b) DEFENSES; ADMISSIONS AND DENIALS.
(1) In General. In responding to a pleading, a
party must:
(A) state in short and plain terms its
defenses to each claim asserted against it;
and
(B) admit or deny the allegations
asserted against it by an opposing party.
(2) Denials—Responding to the Substance. A
denial must fairly respond to the substance of
the allegation.
(3) General and Specific Denials. A party
that intends in good faith to deny all the
allegations of a pleading—including the
jurisdictional grounds—may do so by a general
denial. A party that does not intend to deny all
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the allegations must either specifically deny
designated allegations or generally deny all
except those specifically admitted.
(4) Denying Part of an Allegation. A party
that intends in good faith to deny only part of an
allegation must admit the part that is true and
deny the rest.
(5) Lacking Knowledge or Information. A
party that lacks knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief about the truth of an
allegation must so state, and the statement has
the effect of a denial.
(6) Effect of Failing to Deny. An allegation—
other than one relating to the amount of
damages—is admitted if a responsive pleading is
required and the allegation is not denied. If a
responsive pleading is not required, an allegation
is considered denied or avoided.
(c) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES.
(1) In General. In responding to a pleading, a
party must affirmatively state any avoidance or
affirmative defense, including:
•

accord and satisfaction;

•

arbitration and award;

•

assumption of risk;

•

contributory negligence;

•

duress;

•

estoppel;

•

failure of consideration;
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•

fraud;

•

illegality;

•

injury by fellow servant;

•

laches;

•

license;

•

payment;

•

release;

•

res judicata;

•

statute of frauds;

•

statute of limitations; and

•

waiver.

(2) Mistaken Designation. If a party
mistakenly designates a defense as a
counterclaim, or a counterclaim as a defense, the
court must, if justice requires, treat the pleading
as though it were correctly designated, and may
impose terms for doing so.
(d) PLEADING TO BE CONCISE AND
ALTERNATIVE STATEMENTS; INCONSISTENCY.

DIRECT;

(1) In General. Each allegation must be
simple, concise, and direct. No technical form is
required.
(2) Alternative Statements of a Claim or
Defense. A party may set out 2 or more
statements of a claim or defense alternatively or
hypothetically, either in a single count or defense
or in separate ones. If a party makes alternative

10a
statements, the pleading is sufficient if any one
of them is sufficient.
(3) Inconsistent Claims or Defenses. A party
may state as many separate claims or defenses
as it has, regardless of consistency.
(e) CONSTRUING PLEADINGS. Pleadings must be
construed so as to do justice.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 12
Defenses and Objections: When and How
Presented; Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings; Consolidating Motions; Waiving
Defenses; Pretrial Hearing
(a) TIME TO SERVE A RESPONSIVE PLEADING.
(1) In General. Unless another time is
specified by this rule or a federal statute, the
time for serving a responsive pleading is as
follows:
(A) A defendant must serve an answer:
(i) within 21 days after being served
with the summons and complaint; or
(ii) if it has timely waived service
under Rule 4(d), within 60 days after the
request for a waiver was sent, or within
90 days after it was sent to the defendant
outside any judicial district of the United
States.
(B) A party must serve an answer to a
counterclaim or crossclaim within 21 days
after being served with the pleading that
states the counterclaim or crossclaim.
(C) A party must serve a reply to an
answer within 21 days after being served
with an order to reply, unless the order
specifies a different time.
(2) United States and Its Agencies, Officers,
or Employees Sued in an Official Capacity. The
United States, a United States agency, or a
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United States officer or employee sued only in an
official capacity must serve an answer to a
complaint, counterclaim, or crossclaim within 60
days after service on the United States attorney.
(3) United States Officers or Employees Sued
in an Individual Capacity. A United States
officer or employee sued in an individual capacity
for an act or omission occurring in connection
with duties performed on the United States’
behalf must serve an answer to a complaint,
counterclaim, or crossclaim within 60 days after
service on the officer or employee or service on
the United States attorney, whichever is later.
(4) Effect of a Motion. Unless the court sets a
different time, serving a motion under this rule
alters these periods as follows:
(A) if the court denies the motion or
postpones its disposition until trial, the
responsive pleading must be served within
14 days after notice of the court’s action; or
(B) if the court grants a motion for a
more definite statement, the responsive
pleading must be served within 14 days after
the more definite statement is served.
(b) HOW TO PRESENT DEFENSES. Every defense to
a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in
the responsive pleading if one is required. But a
party may assert the following defenses by motion:
(1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction;
(2) lack of personal jurisdiction;
(3) improper venue;
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(4) insufficient process;
(5) insufficient service of process;
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted; and
(7) failure to join a party under Rule 19.
A motion asserting any of these defenses must be
made before pleading if a responsive pleading is
allowed. If a pleading sets out a claim for relief that
does not require a responsive pleading, an opposing
party may assert at trial any defense to that claim.
No defense or objection is waived by joining it with
one or more other defenses or objections in a
responsive pleading or in a motion.
(c) MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS.
After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not
to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the
pleadings.
(d) RESULT OF PRESENTING MATTERS OUTSIDE THE
PLEADINGS. If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or
12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to
and not excluded by the court, the motion must be
treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.
All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to
present all the material that is pertinent to the
motion.
(e) MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT. A
party may move for a more definite statement of a
pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed
but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party
cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion
must be made before filing a responsive pleading and
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must point out the defects complained of and the
details desired. If the court orders a more definite
statement and the order is not obeyed within 14 days
after notice of the order or within the time the court
sets, the court may strike the pleading or issue any
other appropriate order.
(f) MOTION TO STRIKE. The court may strike from
a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. The
court may act:
(1) on its own; or
(2) on motion made by a party either before
responding to the pleading or, if a response is not
allowed, within 21 days after being served with
the pleading.
(g) JOINING MOTIONS.
(1) Right to Join. A motion under this rule
may be joined with any other motion allowed by
this rule.
(2) Limitation on Further Motions. Except as
provided in Rule 12(h)(2) or (3), a party that
makes a motion under this rule must not make
another motion under this rule raising a defense
or objection that was available to the party but
omitted from its earlier motion.
(h) WAIVING AND PRESERVING CERTAIN DEFENSES.
(1) When Some Are Waived. A party waives
any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(2)–(5) by:
(A) omitting it from a motion in the
circumstances described in Rule 12(g)(2); or
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(B) failing to either:
(i) make it by motion under this
rule; or
(ii) include it in a responsive
pleading or in an amendment allowed by
Rule 15(a)(1) as a matter of course.
(2) When to Raise Others. Failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, to join a
person required by Rule 19(b), or to state a legal
defense to a claim may be raised:
(A) in any pleading allowed or ordered
under Rule 7(a);
(B) by a motion under Rule 12(c); or
(C) at trial.
(3) Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction. If
the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must
dismiss the action.
(i) HEARING BEFORE TRIAL. If a party so moves,
any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(1)–(7)—whether
made in a pleading or by motion—and a motion
under Rule 12(c) must be heard and decided before
trial unless the court orders a deferral until trial.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56
Summary Judgment
(a) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. A party may move for
summary judgment, identifying each claim or
defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on
which summary judgment is sought. The court shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. The court should state on the record the reasons
for granting or denying the motion.
(b) TIME TO FILE A MOTION. Unless a different
time is set by local rule or the court orders otherwise,
a party may file a motion for summary judgment at
any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery.
(c) PROCEDURES.
(1) Supporting Factual Positions. A party
asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials
in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the
motion only), admissions, interrogatory
answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do
not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party

17a
cannot produce
support the fact.

admissible

evidence

to

(2) Objection That a Fact Is Not Supported
by Admissible Evidence. A party may object that
the material cited to support or dispute a fact
cannot be presented in a form that would be
admissible in evidence.
(3) Materials Not Cited. The court need
consider only the cited materials, but it may
consider other materials in the record.
(4) Affidavits or Declarations. An affidavit or
declaration used to support or oppose a motion
must be made on personal knowledge, set out
facts that would be admissible in evidence, and
show that the affiant or declarant is competent
to testify on the matters stated.
(d) WHEN FACTS ARE UNAVAILABLE TO THE
NONMOVANT. If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or
declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot
present facts essential to justify its opposition, the
court may:
(1) defer considering the motion or deny it;
(2) allow time to obtain affidavits
declarations or to take discovery; or

or

(3) issue any other appropriate order.
(e) FAILING TO PROPERLY SUPPORT OR ADDRESS A
FACT. If a party fails to properly support an assertion
of fact or fails to properly address another party’s
assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court
may:
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(1) give an opportunity to properly support
or address the fact;
(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes
of the motion;
(3) grant summary judgment if the motion
and supporting materials—including the facts
considered undisputed—show that the movant is
entitled to it; or
(4) issue any other appropriate order.
(f) JUDGMENT INDEPENDENT OF THE MOTION.
After giving notice and a reasonable time to respond,
the court may:
(1) grant
nonmovant;

summary

judgment

for
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(2) grant the motion on grounds not raised
by a party; or
(3) consider summary judgment on its own
after identifying for the parties material facts
that may not be genuinely in dispute.
(g) FAILING TO GRANT ALL THE REQUESTED
RELIEF. If the court does not grant all the relief
requested by the motion, it may enter an order
stating any material fact—including an item of
damages or other relief—that is not genuinely in
dispute and treating the fact as established in the
case.
(h) AFFIDAVIT OR DECLARATION SUBMITTED IN
BAD FAITH. If satisfied that an affidavit or
declaration under this rule is submitted in bad faith
or solely for delay, the court—after notice and a
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reasonable time to respond—may order the
submitting party to pay the other party the
reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, it
incurred as a result. An offending party or attorney
may also be held in contempt or subjected to other
appropriate sanctions.

